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ABSTRACT
OS-based page sharing is a commonly used optimization in
modern systems to reduce memory footprint. Unfortunately,
such sharing can cause Flush+Reload cache attacks, whereby
a spy periodically flushes a cache line of shared data (using
the clflush instruction) and reloads it to infer the access
patterns of a victim application. Current proposals to mitigate
Flush+Reload attacks are impractical as they either disable
page sharing, or require application rewrite, or require OS
support, or incur ISA changes. Ideally, we want to tolerate
attacks without requiring any OS or ISA support and while
incurring negligible performance and storage overheads.
This paper makes the key observation that when a cache
line is invalidated due to a Flush-Caused Invalidation (FCI),
the tag and data of the invalidated line are still resident in
the cache and can be used for detecting Flush-based attacks.
We call lines invalidated due to FCI as Zombie lines. Our
design explicitly marks such lines as Zombies, preserves the
Zombie lines in the cache, and uses the hits and misses to
Zombie lines to tolerate the attacks. We propose Zombie-
Based Mitigation (ZBM), a simple hardware-based design
that successfully guards against attacks by simply treating
hits on Zombie-lines as misses to avoid any timing leaks
to the attacker. We analyze the robustness of ZBM using
three spy programs: attacking AES T-Tables, attacking RSA
Square-and-Multiply, and Function Watcher (FW), and show
that ZBM successfully defends against these attacks. Our
solution requires negligible storage (4-bits per cacheline),
retains OS-based page sharing, requires no OS/ISA changes,
and does not incur slowdown for benign applications.
1. INTRODUCTION
Caches alleviate the long latency of main memories by
providing data with low latency. Unfortunately, the timing
difference between the cache hit and a cache miss can be used
as a side-channel by an adversary to infer the access pattern
and obtain unauthorized information from the system. Such
cache attacks have been demonstrated to leak sensitive infor-
mation like encryption keys [1] and user browsing activity in
the cloud [2]. More recent attacks like Spectre [3] and Melt-
down [4] use cache-based side-channels to convert sensitive
data accessed illegally into discernible information. Given
their widespread impact, there is a pressing need for efficient
mitigation of such cache side-channels. At the same time, it
is also important to preserve the benefits of the performance
optimizations, that are often the cause of these side channels.
OS-based page sharing [5,6] is a commonly used optimiza-
tion in modern systems to avoid redundant copies of pages
across applications (such as for library code) or for supporting
multiple copies of the same data pages (by deduplicating data
pages). Such sharing allows different programs accessing the
same library code to get routed to the same OS page. While
OS-based page sharing is useful for memory capacity, such
sharing leads to cache side channels between processes, even
though the pages are shared only in read-only mode.
In this paper, we study cross-core Flush+Reload attack [7],
a highly effective attack that uses the OS-shared pages be-
tween the attacker and the victim. In this attack, the attacker
periodically evicts a cache line that is shared with the victim
from the cache using the clflush instruction, waits for a pre-
defined interval, and then uses a timing check to infer whether
the victim application accessed that line in the interim.
We explain Flush+Reload attack with an example. Figure 1
shows an example of Flush+Reload attack for a given line,
Line-X, of shared data. At time t0, the state of Line-X is
shown (V denoting the valid bit, the tag Tag-X and the data
Data-X). Line-X is shared between the spy and the victim. At
time t1, the spy program (running on Core-Spy) flushes this
line using a clflush instruction. This instruction invokes a
Flush-Caused Invalidation (FCI) that invalidates the given
line in the cache. The spy program then waits for some
time. At a later time t2, the victim program (running on
Core-Victim) may access the Line-X. This access will miss
in the cache and the cache controller will retrieve the data for
Line-X (Data-X) from memory and install it in the cache. At
time t3, the Core-Spy accesses Line-X and measures the time
for the access to determine if Core-Victim accessed the line
during the waiting time. The spy can use the patterns of hits
and misses to infer secret information of the victim.
Prior solutions [8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13] that are highly effective
at guarding the cache against conflict-based attacks (such
as Prime+Probe [14]) become ineffective for Flush-based
attacks, as the attacker can precisely invalidate a given line
from the cache, without relying on any conflicts. Current
proposals to mitigate Flush-based cache attacks primarily
rely on OS-based or software-based techniques. For example,
cache attacks on shared data can be avoided by disabling
sharing of critical pages or by dynamically replicating shared
pages [15], or rewriting the application using transaction
memory semantics [16] or using performance monitoring
counters to detect deviation in behavior of the application [17,
18]. Ideally, we want to protect Flush-based attacks while
retaining page sharing, without requiring a rewrite of victim
applications, and without relying on profile information for
the performance monitoring counters.
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Figure 1: Example of Flush+Reload attack on a shared line. The spy program on Core-Spy flushes Line-X from the
cache and waits. The victim program on Core-Victim accesses Line-X at t2. At t3, the spy accesses Line-X and uses a
timing test to check for a cache hit, and infers that the victim accessed Line-X. Our solution marks lines invalidated due
to Flush-Caused Invalidation (FCI) as a "Zombie" line and monitors hits and misses to Zombie lines to tolerate attacks.
Architectural solutions for mitigating Flush-based cache
attacks fall into two categories: Restriction and Duplication.
SHARP [19] proposes to restrict the use of clflush in user-
mode on read-only pages. However, such a solution requires
changing the ISA definition of clflush and is not backwards
compatible. NewCache [20] proposes to access the cache
line with Process-ID and the line-address – this creates du-
plicate copies of the line in the NewCache if two different
processes concurrently access the same line, thereby avoid-
ing the flush of one process from evicting the line of another.
Unfortunately, such line duplication is incompatible with
inter-process communication. DAWG [21] also proposes to
create a replica of the shared line for each Domain-ID, and
the communicating threads (or processes) must be grouped
within the same Domain. However, DAWG requires OS sup-
port for cache management and for grouping applications
into security domains. The goal of this paper is to develop a
hardware-based solution that does not require any OS support,
does not require ISA changes, does not restrict inter-process
communication, and still mitigates the attack while incurring
negligible overheads. Our solution leverages the hardware
events that are inherent in such attacks.
This paper makes the key observation that when a cache
line is invalidated due to Flush-Caused Invalidation (FCI),
the tag and data of the invalidated line are still resident in the
cache and can be used for detecting Flush-based attacks. For
example, in Figure 1 at time t1, the FCI resets the valid bit of
Line-X while still leaving Tag-X and Data-X in the cache line.
We call such lines invalidated due to FCI that still contain
meaningful Tag and Data information as Zombie lines.
Our solution uses Zombie lines to detect Flush-based at-
tacks and has four parts. (1) Mark the Zombies: To enable
monitoring of Zombie lines, we extend the tag entry of the
cache line to include a bit (Z-bit), to identify it as a Zombie
line (at time t2, Line-X would have Z=1). (2) Protect the
Zombies: Conventional replacement algorithms are designed
to preferentially pick invalid lines on a cache miss. To protect
the Zombie lines, we modify the replacement policy to treat
an invalid Zombie line similar to a valid line, and evict the
line only when it would have been naturally evicted if it had
not received an FCI. (3) Deterministic Victim Selection on
Zombie Miss: On a cache miss, if there is a tag hit on the
invalid Zombie line, we know that the line was recently inval-
idated due to an FCI. We detect such cases, and modify the
replacement algorithm to always pick the invalid-zombie line
as the victim on line install in such scenarios. We retain Z=1
if the data obtained from memory was identical to the data
resident in the line, as this denotes a case where the flush of
the line was done unnecessarily. (4) Mitigate on Zombie Hit:
A hit to a valid zombie line invokes mitigating actions that
tolerate the attack by avoiding leakage of timing information.
We propose Zombie-Based Mitigation (ZBM), a simple
hardware-solution to tolerate cross-core Flush+Reload at-
tacks. ZBM simply treats Zombie hits as cache misses, that
incur the latency of a memory access – by inserting a dummy
memory access, waiting for it to complete, and only then re-
turning the data to the requestor. This eliminates any timing
channel for the attacker as both cache hits and misses incur
the same latency once the line is marked as a zombie line.
We analyze robustness of ZBM using three spy programs
(similar to prior works [16, 19]): (1) Attacking AES T-Tables
(2) Attacking Square-and-Multiply algorithm of RSA, and
(3) Monitoring a victim’s function usage with Function Watcher.
We demonstrate that ZBM successfully mitigates these at-
tacks by closing the timing channel of cache line flushes.
ZBM only requires 1-bit per cache line (Z-bit) in the shared
L3 cache (private L1/L2 caches are unchanged) and causes no
slowdown for applications without flush and reload of identi-
cal contents. For niche applications like persistent memory,
non-coherent I/O, etc. where frequent flushes are possible,
we avoid slowdown by extending our design to ZBMx that
also tracks the flush causing core-id (3 bits per cache line) in
addition to the Z-bit per line. With ZBM and ZBMx, we are
able to avoid slowdown for all typical non-attack scenarios.
Overall this paper makes the following contributions:
1. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to
use the inherent state of the cache to detect Flush-based
cache attacks. We mark the flushed lines as zombies
and check for reloading of identical content on install.
2. We propose a simple hardware mitigation of cross-core
Flush+Reload attack by servicing hits to zombie lines
as misses. Our solution mitigates the attack and incurs
no slowdown for typical benign applications.
3. We show our solutions (ZBM and ZBMx) can be imple-
mented with negligible storage (1-4 bits per cache line),
and without any changes to the OS, software, or ISA.
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2. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION
Modern computing systems rely on sharing the resources
such as the last-level cache and main memory across pro-
cesses to improve efficiency. While such sharing is useful
for performance and reducing cost, the sharing of resources
can create side channels. We discuss the background on OS-
based page sharing, the settings in which such sharing could
lead to a cross-core attack, and typical forms of cache attack.
2.1 OS-Based Page Sharing
OS-based page sharing reduces memory footprint by re-
moving redundant copies of identical pages. Such sharing is
essential for sharing of the text segment of executable files be-
tween processes and for using shared libraries. Furthermore,
memory deduplication is a popular technique to explicitly
identify memory pages containing identical contents in un-
related pages and coalesce these pages into a single unit.
Memory deduplication has been implemented in a variety of
systems [5, 6], including VMWare and PowerVM hypervi-
sors, and in Linux and Windows. While read operations are
permitted on deduplicated pages, a write operation results in
a copy-on-write exception (to replicate the page and map it
into the process). While page sharing is useful for effectively
utilizing memory capacity and for enabling shared libraries,
it can lead to side channels which can be exploited by an
attacker, even though the pages are shared in read-only mode.
2.2 Attack Model
In this paper, we focus on cross-core cache attacks, where
the victim and the spy are executing on separate cores of
a multi-core processor. This is a safe assumption in cloud
computing environment, where the non-trusting applications
are not concurrently scheduled on the same core.
Figure 2 shows our system configuration, which contains
a multi-core processor with private L1 and L2 caches, and
a shared L3 cache. The L3 cache is inclusive and evictions
from the L3 cache cause evictions from L1 and L2 (if the
line is present). As L3 cache is the point at which resources
are shared, the adversary tries to orchestrate evictions in the
L3 cache and monitor the hits in the L3 cache to observe
the behavior of the victim program. Such cache attacks have
been used to infer secrets such as the keys for AES [1].
Core
L1L2
Spy
Core
L1L2
Victim
L3 (Shared)
r=1
for i = n−1 downto 0 do
r=mod(r,m)
if e[bit_i] == 1
r=mod(r,m)
return r
DRAM SquareAndMultiplyExp(b,e,m)
r=mul(r,b)
r=sqr(r)
Figure 2: Setup for Cross-Core Attacks (left) and Expo-
nentiation based on Square and Multiply (right)
2.3 Example: RSA Square-And-Multiply
Figure 2 shows the code for the square-and-multiply al-
gorithm used in RSA implementation of GnuPG version
1.4.13 that is vulnerable to cache attacks (recent versions
have moved towards secure implementations). The algorithm
computes (be) mod m, i.e. “b raised to the power of e, mod-
ulo m”. The algorithm iterates from the most-significant bit
of e (the secret key) to the least-significant bit, always per-
forming a square operation (top arrow) and performing the
multiply operation (bottom arrow) only if the bit is "1". By
observing the access pattern for lines containing the square
(sqr) and multiply (mul) functions, the spy can infer the bits
of the secret (e) – sqr followed by sqr is a 0 whereas sqr
followed by mul is a 1. The lines containing the instructions
for the sqr and the mul functions are called probe addresses.
The spy can infer the access pattern of the victim by caus-
ing an eviction of the probe address, waiting, and then testing
if the probe address was accessed by the victim (by checking
if a hit is obtained for the probe address). Depending on how
the evictions are performed, cache attacks can be classified
as either (a) conflict-based attacks or (b) flush-based attacks.
2.4 Conflict-Based Attack and Mitigation
In conflict-based attacks [14], the attacker fills a cache set
with its own lines and causes a conflict miss on one of the
victim lines. The attacker uses a timing test to see if any of
the installed lines encounter a miss – if so, the attacker can
infer that the victim accessed the particular set. Fortunately,
conflict-based cache attacks can be efficiently mitigated by
using cache-space preservation [8,9,21,22] or by randomizing
the location of the line in the cache [8, 12, 13]. Without loss
of generality, in our study, we assume the cache is protected
against conflict-based attacks using randomization [13] and
we focus on only flush-based cache attacks.
2.5 Flush-Based Cache Attack
Cache attacks do not always have to use load/store in-
structions to cause cache evictions. They can use an instruc-
tion called Cache Line Flush (clflush), which explicitly
invalidates the cache line from all levels of the processor
cache hierarchy, including the instruction and data [23]. The
clflush instruction is conventionally provided by the sys-
tem to support non-coherent IO, whereby the IO device can
write directly to memory and use clflush instructions to
ensure that the process can read the up-to-date copy from
memory instead of the stale copy from the cache [23].
Flush-based attacks target accesses to the memory loca-
tions that are shared between the attacker and the victim. In a
Flush+Reload attack, the spy invalidates the shared line using
the clflush instruction, waits, and then checks the timing
of a later access to that line – if the access incurs shorter
latency, then the attacker can infer that the victim application
has accessed the given line. While Flush-based attacks are
restricted to only shared pages, they are more powerful than
conflict-based attacks, because the spy can learn about the
exact line being used instead of just the particular cache set.
While users can ensure that data pages containing sensitive
data are not explicitly shared with an untrusted application,
shared libraries can end up being implicitly shared by the
OS. Thus, using library code (like RSA or AES for encryp-
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tion and decryption) can allow an attacker to monitor the
access pattern to different functions and cryptographic tables
within those functions, to infer secret information such as
cryptographic keys. For example, for the square and multiply
routine showed in Figure 2, the adversary can flush the line
corresponding to square and multiply functions and learn
the access pattern of a victim. We want to develop efficient
solutions for tolerating cross-core Flush+Reload attacks.1
2.6 Prior Solutions for Flush+Reload Attack
Current proposals to mitigate Flush+Reload attacks pri-
marily rely on OS-based or software-based techniques. For
example, cache attacks on shared data can be avoided by
extending the OS to disable sharing of critical pages. Zhou et
al. [15] proposed a scheme to dynamically replicate shared
pages if multiple processes are concurrently accessing such
pages, thus giving up on the capacity benefits of page shar-
ing. Gruss et al. [16] proposes to rewrite safety-critical soft-
ware using transactional memory semantics, which means
transactions that have concurrent memory accesses to shared
location by other processes will cause transaction abort and
avoid leakage of timing information to concurrently running
applications. Prior studies [17, 18] have also suggested using
hardware performance counters to observe deviation in the
behavior of applications to detect attacks, assuming profile
information of the applications (during attack-free scenario)
is available. Unfortunately, such profile information may not
be available for all applications that use shared pages.
Architectural solutions for mitigating flush-based attacks
fall in two categories. First, redefining the usage of clflush.
For example, SHARP [19] proposes to restrict clflush in
user-mode from flushing read-only pages. Such a solution
requires changing the ISA definition of clflush and is not
backwards compatible. Second, creating in-cache duplicates
of the shared line, so a flush triggered by one process cannot
dislodge the line brought in by another process. For exam-
ple, both NewCache [20] and DAWG [21] use in-cache line
duplication to mitigate flush-based attack. Unfortunately,
such a solution of line duplication is either incompatible with
inter-process communication (NewCache) or may require
careful placement by the OS to designate the communicating
processes within the same security domain (DAWG).
2.7 Goal of Our Paper
The goal of this paper is to develop a practical solution
to mitigate cross-core Flush+Reload attacks. For a solution
to be useful, it is important that it not only provides strong
protection against attacks but also has (1) Negligible perfor-
mance overheads when the system is not under attack, (2)
Negligible hardware overhead, (3) No restriction on capacity
benefits of page sharing, (4) No requirement of rewriting the
software, (5) No changes to the OS or the ISA, and (6) No
limitation on inter-process communication. Our paper devel-
ops a practical solution to tolerate attacks by leveraging the
hardware properties that are inherent in flush-based attacks.
We describe our solution next.
1Another form of Flush-based attack is the Flush+Flush attack [24],
which exploits the timing difference between flush of a resident line
and a non-resident line. We discuss how our solution can be used to
mitigate Flush+Flush attacks in Section 7.1.
3. MITIGATING ATTACKS VIA ZOMBIES
Our objective is to differentiate an “attack” from a benign
use-case of clflush like non-coherent IO. We observe that
for the intended use of clflush, the data value resident in
memory is expected to change between the flush and subse-
quent read to the line. For an attack however, a given line
is repeatedly flushed, and the data read from memory is un-
changed, compared to the data present in the line when it was
invalidated due to the flush. If we have the line address and
data of the lines that were invalidated recently due to a flush,
we can use it to detect Flush+Reload attacks.
We leverage the key insight that when a cache line gets
invalidated due to a Flush-Caused Invalidation (FCI), the
valid bit of the cache line is reset; but the Tag and Data of
the invalidated line continue to be present in the cache in
the same location. In fact, we can use them for comparison
with the Tag and Data of lines installed on subsequent cache
misses, to efficiently detect and tolerate Flush+Reload attack.
3.1 Determining a Zombie Line
We call a line invalidated due to Flush-Caused Invalidation
a Zombie line, as it still retains its Tag and Data in the cache.
(Note: Invalidations due to other reasons such as coherence,
system restart, etc. are not deemed Zombies). To track the
Zombie status, we add a Z-bit (Zombie bit) to the tag entry
of each line. The Z-bit for a line is set to 1, only when it is
invalidated due to an FCI. Once set, the Z-bit is reset to 0,
only when either the Tag or the Data for the line are updated.
3.2 Basic Operations for Zombie Scheme
Our Zombie-based design contains four steps: (1) Mark
the Zombie (2) Protect the Zombie (3) Actions on Zombie-
Miss (4) Actions on Zombie Hits. We explain these steps
with an example, as shown in Figure 3, which is identical to
Figure 1, except that Line-X now also contains the Z-bit.
At time t0, the line is resident in the cache with tag as
Tag-X and data as Data-X. The valid bit (V) is 1 and the
line is not a zombie (Z=0). At time t1, the line receives a
Flush-Caused Invalidation (FCI) from the spy.
Step-1. Mark the Zombie on FCI: We assume the cache
is equipped with signals to identify an invalidation due to
clflush. On receiving a FCI, the valid bit for the line is
reset (V=0) and the line is marked as a zombie line (Z=1). If
the line was dirty, the contents are written back to memory
(the zombie status is independent of whether the invalidated
line was clean or dirty). After the FCI, the line continues to
retain Tag-X and Data-X.
Step-2. Protect the Zombie Until Natural Eviction: Re-
placement policies preferentially pick invalid lines as replace-
ment victims on a cache miss. So, an invalid zombie line can
be quickly dislodged if there is another miss to the same set.
To avoid this, we ensure a zombie line resides in the cache
until it would have been naturally evicted, in the absence of a
FCI. We achieve this by modifying the replacement algorithm
to not pick an invalid zombie line as a victim, unless it would
have been picked anyway based on its recency/reuse status.
For example, for LRU replacement policy, the invalid zombie
line is not victimized until it becomes the LRU line. All
through the residency of the invalid-zombie line in the cache,
4
Flush−X Read−X Hit−X? Read−X
t0 
 (initial)
t2
 (VictimRead)
t3
 (Reload&Test)
time
Tag−X
Data−X
t1
 (Flush)
Tag−X Tag−XTag−X
Data−X Data−X Data−X
State of Line−X
V=1
Z=0
V=0
Z=1
V=1 V=1
Z=1
Zombie Miss, Check Data−X Mark Zombie & Protect Zombie 
Flush−Caused 
Invalidation (FCI)
Miss for Line−X,
Install in Zombie Line
Z=1
NO
Treat Zombit Hit as Miss,
Access Memory
Core−Spy Core−Victim Core−Spy Core−Spy
Zombie Hit, Mitigate
Figure 3: Detecting and Mitigating Flush+Reload attack using Zombie. A line that is invalidated due to clflush is
marked as a zombie (Z=1). A cache miss that has matching tag for a zombie line is termed Zombie-Miss – incoming
line is installed in the Zombie line and Z=1 is maintained if incoming data matches resident data. A cache hit for a line
with Z=1 is termed as Zombie-Hit. Our solution mitigates attack by servicing the Zombie-Hit with a latency of a miss.
the line continues to get replacement status updates similar to
valid lines (so, for LRU replacement, the invalid zombie line
would traverse all the way from MRU to LRU, and only then
get evicted). Protecting invalid zombie lines does not slow
down the system as flushes are typically performed only for
few (tens of) lines, whereas our L3 cache with randomized
indexing [13] has tens of thousands of locations where new
line accesses and installs may potentially map to.
Step-3. Act on Zombie-Miss (tag hit on invalid-zombie):
Conventional cache designs skip the tag match for invalid
lines, while probing a set on a cache access. Instead, we per-
form the tag match even for invalid zombie lines, to identify
a cache miss where an invalid zombie line with a matching
tag was present in the cache set. We deem such a miss to be
a Zombie-Miss. In the event of such a Zombie-Miss, data is
retrieved from memory similar to a normal cache miss. In ad-
dition, the incoming cache line is deterministically placed in
the cache way where the Zombie line was located, before the
valid bit is set. If the data retrieved from memory is different
from the data originally in the Zombie line, it indicates a le-
gitimate use of clflush (e.g. an asynchronous IO modified
the memory contents between the flush and the access), so we
reset the zombie status (Z=0) of the line. However, if the data
retrieved from memory is identical to the data originally in
the Zombie line, then the Zombie status is retained (Z=1), as
the flush was unnecessary and the line could be under attack.
This scenario is shown at time t2 in Figure 3.
Table 1: Outcome of Cache Access with Zombie
Zombie Valid Tag Match? Meaning and/or Action
X X No Normal Miss
0 0 Yes Normal Miss
0 1 Yes Normal Hit
1 0 Yes Zombie-Miss (Step-3)
1 1 Yes Zombie Hit (Step-4)
Step-4. Act on Zombie-Hit (tag hit on valid-zombie): On
a cache hit, our design checks the Z-bit of the line in parallel
with the tag-match. If a cache hit occurs on a valid-zombie
line, we deem it as a Zombie Hit. In a conventional non-
secure design, an attacker could use such hits on previously
flushed lines and the corresponding short access time, to
infer a victim access to the line. Our design can detect such
Zombie-Hits and invoke mitigative actions to close the timing
leak, as shown at time t3 in Figure 3.
Table 1 summarizes the cache operations using the zombie-
bit in our design. Note that we restrict zombie-bit and associ-
ated operations only to the L3 cache, as it is the shared cache
in our system, and the one exploited in the cross-core attack.
3.3 Zombie-Based Mitigation (ZBM)
Given that Zombie-Misses and Zombie-Hits are intrinsic
to the Flush+Reload attack, tracking their episodes can help
detect an attack. For example, hardware counters can be
maintained that increment on Zombie-Misses and Zombie-
Hits, and if the count exceeds a certain threshold, a potential
attack can be flagged to the OS to activate mitigating actions.
However, we ideally want a solution that can mitigate the
attack transparently in hardware, without requiring any OS
support or threshold-based decisions.
Our insight is that the timing difference between a Zombie-
Hit and Zombie-Miss is vital for a successful Flush+Reload
attack – eliminating it can completely mitigate the attack.
This is because the attack uses timing to guess the outcome
of the spy-access following the flush to leak information. A
fast access (Zombie-Hit) implies the victim accessed the line
between the flush and spy-access, whereas a slow access
(Zombie-Miss) implies the victim did not access the line. To
eliminate the timing difference between Zombie-Hits and
Zombie-Misses and prevent any information leakage, we
propose a simple hardware-based scheme, Zombie-Based
Mitigation (ZBM) that delays Zombie-Hits and makes them
incur the same latency as a Zombie-Miss.
On Zombie-Hits, ZBM adds delays by triggering an ex-
traneous memory access for the same line, and returning the
cached data to the processor only after this dummy request
completes (the data obtained from the memory is ignored and
not installed in the cache). As this exactly emulates the oper-
ations (memory access) on a Zombie-Miss, it incurs a similar
long-latency. Thus, during the Flush+Reload attack, the spy-
access in the reload phase leaks no information – the access
incurs the high latency of a cache miss and memory access,
regardless of whether the line was accessed by the victim
(Zombie-Hit) or not (Zombie-Miss). Note that a Zombie-
Hit is recorded as a Cache-Miss by the cache performance
counters, so no information is leaked even through program
5
statistics. Figure 4 shows the time-line for Zombie-Miss/Hit
in our design, illustrating the lack of a timing difference.
Cache−Miss
Memory Access
To Processor
Zombie−Hit To Processor
Cached−Data Returned
Cache−Hit
To Processor
Cached−Data Returned
Memory Data Returned
(a)
(b)
(c)
0 tc tc+tmem
Memory Access (Dummy Request)
(or Zombie-Miss)
Figure 4: With Zombie-Based Mitigation, timeline for
servicing (a) Cache Hit (tc) (b) Cache Miss/Zombie-Miss
(tc + tmem) (c) Zombie-Hit (tc + tmem) – same latency as
Zombie-Miss (note that ZBM sends a dummy request to
memory to estimate the latency of Zombie-Miss).
The episode of flushing a line, retrieving it with identical
content from memory and then accessing it again from the
L3 cache and not L1/L2 cache, and doing so repeatedly, does
not occur in typical applications. So, the higher latency (and
additional energy overhead) due to the extra memory accesses
on Zombie-Hits does not impact benign applications.
4. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF ZBM
We analyze the effectiveness of ZBM at defending against
Flush+Reload attack using three representative attacks (adapted
from prior works [16, 19]): (1) Attacking the AES T-tables,
(2) Snooping a victim’s control flow during secret-dependent
function execution, and (3) Attacking the Square-And-Multiply
algorithm of RSA. We evaluate the attack on a baseline sys-
tem without any mitigation and on a system with ZBM. Our
system contains 8 cores sharing a 16MB L3 cache (system
configuration is shown in Table 2). Despite using a noise-free
setting that allows high attack fidelity, we show that ZBM
can successfully mitigate all of these attacks.
4.1 Attacking AES T-Table Implementation
Commonly used crypto libraries like OpenSSL and GnuPG
implement AES with T-tables, which have been shown to be
vulnerable to cache-attacks that leak the secret key [1,16,25].
In such an implementation, in each of the 10 AES rounds,
a total of 16 accesses are made to T-tables (lookup tables)
spread over 16 cachelines. The table indices accessed in each
round depend on the input plaintext p and a secret key k, with
the first-round indices being (xi = pi
⊕
ki), where i is the byte
number in the plaintext or the key.
We perform a chosen-plaintext attack on the first round. In
such an attack, the spy supplies a series of plaintext blocks
to be encrypted by the victim, keeping byte p0 constant and
randomly varying the other pi for i 6= 0. This ensures that
a fixed index x0 always receives a hit in the first round, and
has a higher number of hits on average compared to other
entries in the T-table. By identifying which T-table cacheline
received maximum hits using a Flush+Reload attack over a
large number of encryptions, the spy can decipher 4-bits out
of 8-bits of the index x0 (that determine the cacheline number)
and thus extract 4 out of 8 bits of k0 (as p0 is known). By
sequentially changing which plaintext byte is constant, the
spy can recover 64 out of 128 bits of the secret key.
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Figure 5: Flush+Reload Attack on AES T-tables for the
(1) baseline system without ZBM and (b) system with
ZBM protection. Heat map of hits to T-table cachelines
seen by spy, for different values of plaintext byte p0,
when the first byte of the key k0 = 0.
Figure 5 shows the number of hits observed by the spy
across the cachelines of the T-tables for different values of
first plaintext byte p0, with 10K blocks encrypted per plain-
text. The results for both the (a) baseline system without
ZBM and (b) with ZBM protection are normalized to the
maximum hits for any cacheline across both configurations.
In the baseline, as p0 (and x0 = p0
⊕
0) increases from 0 to
255, the cacheline corresponding to x0 (the table index with
the maximum hits) discernibly changes from 0 to 15 as seen
in Figure 5, with each cacheline storing 16 entries. Compared
to the average of 1368 hits/cacheline, the maximum observed
is 1892 hits/cacheline. With ZBM, the spy does not see any
pattern because ZBM always provides data with latency of
memory access on both Zombie-Hits and Zombie-Misses.2
4.2 Function Watcher - Leak Execution Path
Just as a spy can snoop the data-access pattern of the vic-
tim, it can also snoop a victim’s code-access patterns to leak
information. Recently, such attacks were demonstrated on
PDF processing applications [2] where a spy snoops the func-
tions executed by the program to identify the rendered PDF.
On these lines, we model a Function Watcher attack similar
to prior work [16], where a victim executes a call to one out
of four functions based on a secret value (each function has
5000+ instructions with varying control-flow). The spy moni-
tors the addresses corresponding to the entry points of these
functions by repeatedly executing a cross-core Flush+Reload
attack. On each reload following a flush, the spy observes
which address received a cache-hit (lowest latency), to infer
the function being executed by the victim.
2In a few rare cases, we see a single hit for the spy across all the
10,000 block encryptions. This happens when a flush from the spy
occurs before the victim had a chance to access the table even a
single time. So on the flush, the Z-bit is not set as the cache does
not even contain the line. Subsequent victim access followed by
the spy access causes the cache hit for the spy. In the AES attack,
all sixteen lines of the tables are accessed thousands of times, with
varying probabilities. Knowing one line was accessed once by the
victim at the start, is not meaningful information for the attacker.
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Figure 6: RSA Attack: Time-line of spy-hits for cachelines in sqr and mul functions in (a) Baseline (b) ZBM. Here, a
SQR-Hit followed by MUL-Hit leaks bit-value "1" in the key, whereas two SQR-Hits one after another denote a "0".
The heat-map in Figure 7 shows the percentage of attempts
where the spy correctly (diagonal-entries) or incorrectly (non-
diagonal entries) infers the function executed by the victim,
over 10K function calls. In the baseline (Figure 7(a)), the spy
correctly infers the function ID of the victim (the secret) in
most of the attempts (91% - 96%).
In ZBM (Figure 7(b)), the attacker successfully infers the
correct function ID in only 23% - 27% of the attempts, which
is as likely as other incorrect function IDs (19% - 31%). Thus,
the attack with ZBM is no better than a random guess. This is
because ZBM ensures that on a spy-reload, both Zombie-Hits
(function entry-point accessed by victim) and Zombie-Misses
(unaccessed addresses) have similar high latency, thus leaking
no information to the spy.
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Figure 7: Function Watcher - A spy inferring which one
out of four functions was accessed by a victim. Heat-map
shows percentage of attempts where a Function-ID x ex-
ecuted by the victim was inferred as y by the spy. In
(a) Baseline the secret can be correctly inferred by the
spy with >90% accuracy, while in (b) ZBM the attack is
only as good as a random-guess.
4.3 RSA Square-And-Multiply Algorithm
To evaluate the effectiveness of ZBM, we analyze an attack
on the Square-And-Multiply algorithm in RSA described in
Section 2.3, similar to prior work [19]. In this attack, the spy
monitors the victim’s accesses to the entry-points of square
function (SQR) and multiply function (MUL), to extract the
secret RSA key. Figure 6 shows the time at which spy-hits
for SQR and MUL are encountered, in a time window of 10K
- 90K cycles for both the baseline (left) and ZBM (right).
In our analysis, we use a RSA key of 3072 bits where
every 8th bit is a 1 (e.g key is 0000000100000001...). For the
attack in the baseline, a hit to SQR followed by a hit to MUL
indicates a "1" in the key, whereas a hit to SQR followed
by another hit to SQR denotes a "0". So we expect the spy
would have eight hits to SQR followed by one hit to MUL.
In Figure 6(a), the spy can observe this exact pattern after
filtering noise (e.g.a spurious double hit for MUL at time
73K cycles is ignored, knowing the behavior of RSA). With
ZBM, the spy always gets high latency on a reload for MUL
and SQR – so the spy does not get any hits, as shown in
Figure 6(b). Thus, ZBM successfully mitigates the attack.
5. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
5.1 Configuration
For our performance evaluations, we use a Pin-based x86
simulator. Table 2 shows the system configuration used in
our study. Our system contains 8 cores, each of which have
a private instruction and data cache and a unified 256KB L2
cache. The L3 cache is 16MB and is shared between all the
cores. All caches use a line size of 64 bytes.
Table 2: Baseline Configuration
Processor
Core parameters 8-cores, 3.2GHz
L1 and L2 cache 32KB, 256KB 8-way (private)
Last Level Cache
L3 (shared) 16MB, 16-way, SRRIP, 24 cycles
DRAM Memory-System
Bus frequency 1200 MHz (DDR 2.4 GHz)
Channels 2 (8-Banks each)
tCAS-tRCD-tRP 14-14-14 nanoseconds
We measure aggregate performance of our 8-core system
using weighted speedup metric. We evaluate performance
under two scenarios: (1) when the system is not under at-
tack, executing only benign applications (common case), and
(2) when system is under attack (uncommon case).
For benign applications, we use a representative slice of
250 million instruction of each of the 29 benchmarks in the
SPEC2006 suite. The benign applications do not have a
"Flush+Reload" pattern. We create a benign workload by
randomly pairing 8 benign applications, and have 100 such
mixed workloads. For attacks, we use 3 pairs of victim-spy
(AES, Function Watcher and RSA) and combine each victim-
spy with six benign applications to create an 8-core workload.
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Figure 8: Normalized system performance with ZBM for 100 random mixes of benign applications + 3 cases of attack
(victim and spy). ZBM incurs no slowdown for benign workloads and also has negligible overheads under attacks.
5.2 Impact on Aggregate System Performance
ZBM inflicts higher latency for a Zombie-Hit. For such
scenarios to occur the line must be flushed, reloaded with
identical content soon (before the line gets evicted from the
cache) and then accessed again while the line is in the L3
cache. Such access patterns are extremely unlikely to occur
in normal (benign) applications, therefore the impact of ZBM
on system performance for benign workloads is expected to
be negligible. Figure 8 shows the slowdown caused by ZBM
for 103 workloads (100 benign + 3 under attack). For calcu-
lating slowdown we compute the ratio of weighted speedup
of the baseline to the weighted speedup of ZBM. For all 100
workloads that do not have an attack, ZBM has no slowdown,
whereas there is a slowdown (up-to 2.2%) for the three attack
workloads containing the victim-spy pairs.
5.3 Slowdown for Applications Under Attack
We analyze the performance of the individual applications
for the three attack workloads that experience a slowdown.
Figure 9 shows the slowdown for each of the eight applica-
tions in the three workloads. The workload contains a spy,
a victim, and six benign bystanders. For AES, ZBM causes
16.4% slowdown for the victim and 5.3% for the spy. For
Function watcher, the slowdown is 1.2% for the victim and
2.1% for the spy. For RSA, the slowdown is 2.6% for the
victim and 10.9% for the spy. Note that these slowdowns
occur only under attack (when marginal slowdown is accept-
able to protect against the attack). The bystander applications
(marked as Benign 1-6 in Figure 9), which are neither a victim
nor a spy do not see a performance impact.
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Figure 9: Application-wise performance for the three
workloads with victim-spy. ZBM causes slowdown for
only the victim and spy, but not the benign co-runners.
5.4 Storage and Logic Overheads
ZBM provides strong protection against attack while caus-
ing no performance overhead when the system is not under
attack. To implement ZBM, the only storage overhead in-
curred is the per-line Z-bit. Therefore, to implement ZBM on
our 16MB LLC, we would need a total storage overhead of
32 kilobytes, which is less than 0.2% of the LLC capacity.
ZBM requires that the incoming data from memory be
compared to the data resident in the cache, if the Z-bit as-
sociated with the victim line is set. To implement a 512-bit
comparator, we need 512 XNOR gates and 511 AND gates,
for a total of approximately 1K gates. This logic overhead
is negligibly small (for reference, computing ECC-1 for a
64-byte line incurs an overhead of approximately 3500 gates).
6. ZBM-X FOR FLUSHING APPLICATIONS
Our performance evaluations focus on workloads that are
attacker-victim pairs (demonstrating the security of ZBM).
The typical benign workloads we evaluate3 do not contain
patterns of Flush+Reload of identical data, and hence have no
slowdown with ZBM. However, there could be other niche
applications which use flushes frequently. For example, lines
evicted with clflush in expectation of a non-coherent IO,
where no IO occurs, could be read subsequently as Zombie
Hits with ZBM. Other unintended usage of clflush can
occur in persistent memory applications, which use it to evict
and write dirty cache lines to memory, even though more
suitable instructions like clwb (cache line writeback) exist.
Even with frequent flushes, ZBM’s slowdown is expected
to be minimal as several conditions need to be true at the same
time to suffer slowdown – (a) application has to flush lines,
(b) then reload identical data, and (c) the data has to be larger
than private L2-cache (256 KB), so that subsequent loads
to it are all serviced from L3-cache. This is uncommon, as
subsequent loads are likely to be serviced, in most scenarios,
from L1 or L2 cache without overheads (Z-bit is restricted
to the L3 cache). Nonetheless, to understand the slowdown
of ZBM for flushing applications, we develop an analytical
model. Then, we design a simple extension of ZBM to avoid
slowdown even in the uncommon scenario of frequent flushes.
3Typical use of clflush is for non-coherent IO [23] – such appli-
cations are not amenable to typical tracing infrastructure, so tracing
them is beyond our scope. Instead, we develop an analytical model
to estimate slowdown of ZBM for such flushing applications.
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Figure 10: Normalized Average L3 Access Latency (L3Lat) and Slowdown with ZBM, as a function of Flush-Percentage
(F) and Probability of Reloading Identical Content (R). ZBM slowdown is negligible, if either F or R are small. Even for
pathological scenarios with Flush and Reload of Identical Data all the time (F=100%,R=100%), the slowdown is <40%.
6.1 Analytical Model - L3Lat and Slowdown
Slowdown with ZBM is due to Zombie-Hits being serviced
with the latency of a L3-cache miss instead of a L3-cache hit,
to prevent leaking information. So, we first develop a model
to estimate the average latency for a L3 access (L3Lat) with
ZBM and then model its impact on execution time.
6.1.1 Modelling L3 Access Latency (L3Lat)
Let α be the miss-rate of the baseline L3-cache. Let tc be
the number of cycles for a L3-cache hit and tm be the number
of cycles to service a memory access. Then L3Lat for the
baseline system (L3Latbase) is given by Equation 1.
L3Latbase = tc+α · tm (1)
Let F be the percentage of memory accesses that occurred
due to a flush of the cache line (line was present in the cache
but got invalidated due to clflush). Let R be the probability
that the reloaded content is identical to the content of the line
at the time of the flush. Thus, F ·R represents the probability
of flush and reload of identical content. If all memory ac-
cesses were flush-reload of identical contents (i.e. F ·R= 1),
then we expect the L3-miss rate in ZBM to increase to 100%.
In general, for any given value of F and R, the miss-rate of
the ZBM (αZBM) is given by Equation 2.
αZBM = α+(1−α) ·F ·R (2)
Using Equation 1 and 2, the L3Lat for the ZBM system
(L3LatZBM) is given by Equation 3.
L3LatZBM = tc+(α+(1−α) ·F ·R) · tm (3)
Dividing Equation 3 by Equation 2, we get the normalized
value (L3Latnorm), as shown in Equation 4 and in Figure 10.
L3Latnorm =
tc+(α+(1−α) ·F ·R) · tm
tc+α · tm (4)
6.1.2 Modelling Overall System Slowdown
Execution time of the baseline system (Tbase) can be split
into two components, the time required with a perfect L2-
cache (Tper f L2) and the time spent accessing L3 and memory
(TL3mem), as shown in Equation 5.
Tbase = Tper f L2 +TL3mem (5)
For ZBM, TL3mem increases in proportion to L3Lat. There-
fore, the execution time of the application with ZBM (TZBM)
can be written as Equation 6.
TZBM = Tper f L2 +L3Latnorm ·TL3mem (6)
The slowdown of ZBM can be obtained by dividing Equa-
tion 6 by Equation 5, as shown in Equation 7.
Slowdown= 1+(L3Latnorm−1) · TL3memTbase (7)
6.2 Impact on L3Lat and Slowdown
For our system, we use tc = 24 cycles and tm = 145 cycles.
Without loss of generality, we assume an application that
spends half of the execution time in L3/memory accesses
(Tbase = 2 ·TL3mem) and has a baseline L3 hit-rate (α) of 50%.
Using these values with Equations 4 and 7, we plot L3Lat and
Slowdown in Figure 10 for different values of F and R. Our
model shows that an application reloading identical data after
flush for <10% of its accesses will have negligible slowdown
with ZBM. Moreover, even pathological scenarios where all
memory accesses are reloads of unchanged data after flush,
have a slowdown that is less than 40%.
6.3 ZBMx (an extension) to Avoid Slowdown
It is expected that only an uncommon class of workloads
incur slowdown with ZBM – with frequent flushes to majority
of their working set, reload of identical data from memory
to cache, and a high hit-rate in L3 for the reloaded contents.
To avoid slowdown even in such uncommon scenarios, we
extend ZBM to allow cache-hits on a Zombie-line, once the
line had a reload from the flush-causing-core, that nullifies
the effect of the flush. We call this design extension ZBMx.
ZBMx is implemented by tracking the Flush-Causing
Core-ID (FCID), which is set along with the Z-bit, when
the line is invalidated due to a clflush. When a subsequent
access occurs from the same core (coreID matches the line’s
FCID), then the Z-bit of the line is reset. In this design, sub-
sequent accesses after a Flush and Reload (by the same core)
get the line with cache-hit latency, without any slowdown.
ZBMx incurs a storage overhead of 4 bits per line (Z-bit +
3-bit of FCID for an 8-core system), which is still less than
1% of the area of the L3-cache. Thus, system designers can
implement ZBMx with minimal storage overhead, to avoid
slowdown even for applications with frequent flushes like
non-coherent IO, DMA or persistent memory applications
where ZBM might be a potential concern.
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7. SECURITY DISCUSSION
Here, we discuss how ZBM tolerates other attack variants.
7.1 Mitigating Flush+Flush Attack
Flush+Flush [24] attack exploits the variation in latency
of the clflush instruction depending on whether or not the
line is present in the cache, to infer the access of a victim.
Such attacks can be prevented by always serving a flush with
a constant worst-case latency. To limit slowdown to only a
potential attack scenario, we can activate such constant-time
service of flush only if the flush is to a line with the Z-bit
set – as repeatedly executing a successful attack requires
performing a flush on a recently flushed line (with Z-bit set).
7.2 Tolerating Alternate Eviction Mechanisms
Cache Conflicts: Cache-set conflict based attacks, like
Prime+Probe [14], can be prevented by using way partition-
ing [9, 21] or by randomizing the cache indexing [8, 12, 13].
We assume our system has randomized indexing [13] for its
shared cache and directory [26].
Natural Eviction or Cache-Thrashing: An adversary
could wait for the victim’s sensitive lines to get naturally
evicted (e.g. by reaching LRU position in a set), through the
victim’s own accesses. Alternately, the adversary could at-
tempt to evict all lines including Zombies by cache-thrashing
(e.g. by accessing a large array). For conclusively evicting a
zombie line in either case, with a randomized-indexing cache,
the adversary would need to wait for tens of thousands of lines
to be installed (to replace the entire contents of the cache).
Such an attack is 10,000x slower than Flush+Reload, that
needs just one access for eviction, and much less practical.
Non-Temporal Stores (NT-Stores) can also evict a cached
line while writing to memory. However, this can be avoided
with an implementation (like Pentium-M [23]) that updates
a line in-place in the cache without eviction, if the location
is cached. This leaves common-case usage of NT-Stores un-
changed, where stores directly write to memory when the
location is uncached,4 without costly Read-For-Ownership.
7.3 Tolerating Alternate Reload Strategies
Alternate attack variants such as Flush+Prefetch [27] and
Invalidate+Transfer [28] perform the reload through a prefetch
or a coherence operation, instead of a direct demand access.
ZBM tolerates these attacks, as it always services zombie-hits
on reload (regardless of its cause) with cache-miss latency.
7.4 Implications for Denial of Service (DoS)
An adversary can attempt a DoS attack by flushing shared
lines and creating a large number of zombies in the cache.
Subsequent victim accesses (zombie-hits) will have slow-
down, until zombie lines are naturally evicted. Fortunately,
this only impacts the L3 cache, as the zombie status is not
propagated to L1/L2 cache – the application retains use of
L1/L2 caches. Worse DoS-attacks not involving ZBM are
possible even in the baseline, where an adversary can repeat-
edly flush lines from all levels of the cache hierarchy, disable
the use of all caches and cause much higher slowdown.
4NT-Store should also update the data for a invalid zombie-line if
present in the cache (a presence check is anyway needed). Thus, an
adversary cannot reset the Z-bit with NT-store and subsequent load.
7.5 Tolerating Main-Memory Attacks
While our primary goal is mitigating Flush+Reload cache
attacks using Zombie-lines, we observe that Zombies can
also help in detecting other attacks that require repeated use
of clflush. In this section, we discuss the application of
Zombie-based detection to DRAM and cache coherence at-
tacks (unfortunately, evaluating these is beyond our scope due
to space limitations). Compared to naively counting flushes,
counting flushes-on-zombies could lower the false-positives
in attack detection – as this can detect episodes of repeat
flushes to the same line (common to such attacks)
7.5.1 Tolerating DRAM Timing Side-Channels
DRAMA [29] exploits DRAM row-buffer timing as a side-
channel. This attack uses the timing difference between
row-hit and row-miss to leak the access pattern. To execute at
a sufficiently fast rate, the attack requires flush of the cache
line in each iteration to ensure that the data is always read
from memory. As these attacks incur frequent episodes of
Zombie-Miss and then Flush-on-Zombie, we can count such
episodes with dedicated hardware counters and detect a po-
tential attack. When the counters cross a threshold, mitigation
can be performed by switching to a closed-page policy.
7.5.2 Tolerating DRAM Row-Hammer Attacks
Row-Hammer attacks [30] flush two cache lines in each
iteration, each corresponding to a different row in the same
bank of DRAM. This causes frequent accesses to alternate
rows, and a large number of row closures on the same rows
within a short time-period. This injects faults in other neigh-
bouring rows (due to faulty isolation in DRAM technology).
Adversaries leverage this to inject bit-flips and modify access
control bits in sensitive kernel data-structures, engineering
illegal privilege escalation. While this attack can be miti-
gated by increasing the DRAM refresh rate, such a solution
incurs performance and power overheads. Instead, as these at-
tacks incur frequent episodes of Zombie-Miss and then Flush-
on-Zombie, detection is possible with dedicated hardware
counters tracking these episodes. When the count exceeds
a threshold, mitigation can be performed by increasing the
DRAM refresh rate for a certain time period.
7.5.3 Tolerating Coherence-Based Attacks
OS-shared pages can leak information through the coher-
ence status of their cached lines, as per recent attacks [31].
Such attacks exploit the difference in cache access latency,
based on whether the line is in Exclusive (E) or Shared (S)
state. The spy first initializes the line to E, then allows the
victim to execute. Later, by checking if the line is in S (based
on access latency), the spy can infer if the victim accessed it.
For this attack, re-initializing the line to E is essential on
each iteration: achieved with a clflush to invalidate the
line, and a subsequent load to re-install it in E (note: using
stores to invalidate copies of lines leveraging coherence is
not useful as that would unshare OS-shared pages). Hence,
detecting episodes of repeated flush and reload to the same
line, using hardware counters for Zombie-misses and Flushes-
on-Zombies, can help detect such attacks. When the counts
cross a threshold, mitigation can be activated in hardware by
servicing S and E accesses with similar (worst-case) latency.
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8. RELATED WORK
Our proposal leverages the insight that when a cache line
is invalidated on a flush, the tag and the data are still in the
cache and can be used for detecting and tolerating flush-based
attacks. It is partly inspired by past work on Coherence De-
coupling [32] that used the resident tag and data of the lines
invalidated due to coherence, for performing speculative op-
erations (using stale values) while waiting for the coherence
response. In this section, we discuss cache attacks in general
and prior solutions to tolerate Flush+Reload attacks.
8.1 Types of Cache Attacks
Recent works [33, 34] have surveyed both Conflict-Based
Attacks [14, 27, 35] that generate cache-conflicts to invalidate
cachelines and Flush-Based Attacks [7, 24, 28, 31] that use
flushes to invalidate cachelines. These have been used to
attack algorithms like AES [36, 37], RSA [38, 39, 40], etc. in
cryptographic libraries and leak the secret keys.
8.2 Tolerating Conflict-Based Attacks
Conflict-based attacks can be tolerated by either preserving
the data of the victim or through randomization. The exam-
ples of preservation-based approaches includes PLCache [8],
CATalyst [41], StealthMem [42], SecDCP [22] and Non-
Monopolizable (NoMo) Cache [9]. Recent studies, such as
Relaxed Inclusion Cache (RIC) [43] and SHARP [19], have
also targeted the inclusion property of LLC to provide preser-
vation. The examples of randomization-based approaches to
detect or mitigate such attacks include ReplayConfusion [44],
RPCache [8], NewCache [12], and CEASER [13]. However,
such solutions are ineffective at guarding against flush-based
attacks on OS-shared lines as the adversary can evict the line
explicitly without any conflict or inclusion violation.
8.3 Tolerating Attacks with Software Support
Prior studies propose rewriting software to avoid storing
critical information (such as encryption tables) in memory
and instead compute it on-the-fly [14, 45]. Unfortunately,
such revised implementations tend to be 2x to 4x slower than
the original implementation [45]. Our solution avoids the
software engineering effort and slowdown of such methods.
Another proposal [46] prefetches all the sensitive probe-
addresses into the cache (e.g. entire encryption tables) based
on the software context (e.g. before running AES), preventing
an attacker from selectively observing lines accessed by a
victim. However, this cannot scale to prefetch larger shared
libraries and requires SW-rewrite to trigger such prefetch.
8.4 Tolerating Attacks by Restricting clflush
Flush+Reload attacks rely on the use of clflush instruc-
tion for flushing the OS-shared (read-only) lines. SHARP [19]
advocates restricting the use of clflush in user mode on
such read-only lines, and triggering a copy-on-write through
the OS if such an operation is attempted. Unfortunately,
such an approach requires changes to the ISA to redefine the
clflush instruction, is not backwards compatible, and needs
modifications to the OS to handle a trap when a clflush is
issued to deduplicated pages from a user-space application.
Ideally, we want to mitigate the attack in hardware, without
any changes to the ISA or to the OS.
8.5 Tolerating Attacks with OS-based Solutions
Flush-based attacks can be avoided by disabling sharing of
critical pages in OS (as in CATalyst [41] or Apparition [47])
or replicating shared pages on concurrent access by multiple
processes [15]. Unfortunately, such solutions give up the
capacity benefits of page sharing and are not preferable.
Prior studies [17, 18, 48] have suggested using hardware
performance counters or monitoring memory bandwidth [48]
for anomaly detection. Unfortunately, such proposals suffer
from false positives and are not universally applicable, as
profile information is not always available for all applications.
8.6 Tolerating Attacks by Line Duplication
Recent work [20] evaluated NewCache [12] for Flush+
Reload attack by accessing NewCache with Process-ID and
line-address. This creates duplicate copies of the line in the
cache if two different processes concurrently access the same
line, thereby preventing the flush of one process from evicting
the line of another. Unfortunately, such in-cache duplication
is incompatible with inter-process communication. Further-
more, NewCache requires storage for mapping tables and the
OS to classify applications into protected and unprotected
categories, to protect the mapping table from attacks.
DAWG [21] and MI6 [49] allocate a given number of
ways and sets respectively per security domain. They protect
against Flush+Reload attack by creating a duplicate of the OS-
shared line for each domain or disabling page-sharing across
domains, thereby preventing the flush of one domain from
evicting the line of another. Such a design places restrictions
on inter-process communication through shared-memory, in
that the communicating processes must be located in the same
domain. Moreover, OS support is required for both cache
allocation and for assigning processes to security domains.
Ideally, we seek a hardware solution that does not require OS
support and does not restrict inter-process communication.
9. CONCLUSION
Recent vulnerabilities exploiting cache side-channels have
universally impacted the entire computing industry, under-
scoring the importance of mitigating them in next-generation
hardware. In this paper, we investigate solutions for toler-
ating cross-core Flush+Reload attacks. Prior solutions for
mitigating flush-based attacks require either rewrite of the
application, or OS support, or changes to the ISA. Ideally,
we seek a solution that can efficiently mitigate Flush+Reload
attacks without requiring any changes to the software or the
OS or the ISA, and while incurring negligible overheads.
In this paper, we propose a simple hardware mitigation
of Flush+Reload cache attacks using Zombie lines – lines
invalidated by a Flush, but with the tag and data still resident
in the cache. Our solution is based on marking zombies on
flushes and protecting them till such time they would have
been naturally evicted. Our Zombie-Based Mitigation (ZBM)
mitigates the attack in hardware by servicing zombie hits with
the same latency as cache misses, thereby avoiding any timing
leaks. Moreover, ZBM and its extension ZBMx (for niche
applications with frequent flushes) avoid any slowdown for
benign applications and incur a storage overhead of only 1-4
bits per cache line. Thus, ZBM is an effective, yet practical
mitigation for cross-core Flush+Reload attacks.
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